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COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK
People v. Devone'
(decided June 8, 2010)
Damien Devone was indicted for criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the third and fourth degree after police used a
trained narcotic-sniffing dog to conduct a canine sniff of the exterior
of a vehicle, in which he was a passenger. 2 Similarly, Saddiq Abdur-
Rashid was indicted for criminal possession of a controlled substance
in the first degree after police used a trained narcotic-sniffing dog to
conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of his vehicle revealing the
presence of narcotics.3 In a consolidated appeal before the New York
Court of Appeals, Devone and Abdur-Rashid challenged the admis-
sion of the drugs found as a result of these "searches," alleging that
the use of trained narcotic-sniffing dogs to conduct a canine sniff of
the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle constitutes a search under
article I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution, requiring
reasonable suspicion.5 Implicit within this challenge was whether
such conduct also implicates the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.6 The court held that under the New York State
Constitution, a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped ve-
I 931 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 2010).
2 Id. at 72.
' Id at 73.
4 Article I, section 12 of the New York Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The right of
the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated ..... See Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73-74 ("[W]hether a canine sniff consti-
tutes a search is necessarily dependent upon whether it constitutes an intrusion into a place
where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.").
5 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 71.
6 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, in pertinent part: "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated . . . ." In order for a Fourth Amendment search to occur "a per-
son [must] exhibit[] an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expec-
tation be one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' " Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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hicle "constitutes a search requiring founded suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot and that, in each of these cases, such founded suspi-
cion was established."7
In People v. Devone, officers pulled over a vehicle in which
Devone was a passenger, after observing the driver talking on a cell
phone.8 The driver, Troy Washington, was unable to produce his li-
cense or registration at the time of the stop.9 He told the officers that
the vehicle was registered to his cousin, but claimed that he did not
know his cousin's name.' 0 When asked where his cousin was, he
pointed to Devone, who was sitting in the front passenger seat." Af-
ter running the vehicle's license number, the officers discovered that
the vehicle was registered to a female.' 2 While the vehicle had not
been reported stolen, the "suspicious inconsistencies" in Washing-
ton's answers to the officers' questions, coupled with the fact that the
vehicle was registered to a female, led the officers to believe that fur-
ther investigation was required.13 The officers ordered Washington
and Devone out of the vehicle, retrieved a narcotic-sniffing dog from
their SUV, and proceeded to conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of
the vehicle.14
After sniffing the exterior of the vehicle, the dog alerted the
officers to the presence of drugs.'" The officers then allowed the dog
inside to search the interior of the vehicle and the dog began scrat-
ching at the center console.16 The officers searched the center con-
sole of the vehicle and found crack cocaine.' 7 Devone was arrested
and charged with criminal possession of a controlled substance in the
third and fourth degree."
7 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 71-72. New York State prohibits the use of a mobile telephone to make a call
while the vehicle is in motion. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1225-c (McKinney 2010).





14 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 72.
15Id.16 id
'Id
18 Id. For the statutory requirements of criminal possession of a controlled substance in
the third degree, see New York Penal Law § 220.16 (McKinney 2010). For the statutory
requirements of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the fourth degree, see New
[Vol. 27554
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Devone made a motion to suppress the drugs as the product of
an illegal search, alleging that the use of the narcotic-sniffing dog
amounted to an unconstitutional search because it was not supported
by reasonable suspicion.19 After conducting a suppression hearing,
the county court held that a canine sniff constituted a search under ar-
ticle I, section 12 of the New York State Constitution requiring rea-
sonable suspicion and that the police, here, lacked reasonable suspi-
cion to conduct the canine sniff.20 However, the appellate division
reversed, holding that "[i]n light of the diminished expectation of pri-
vacy in a car as opposed to a home and the fact that 'a canine sniff is
far less intrusive than a full-blown search' . . . the presence of a
founded suspicion is sufficient to permit a canine sniff of the exterior
of a car."2 1
Similarly, in People v. Abdur-Rashid, Saddiq Abdur-Rashid
was pulled over for operating a vehicle with a missing front license
plate.22 After confirming that the vehicle's insurance was in effect,
the officer issued Abdur-Rahsid a ticket for the missing license plate
and for operating the vehicle with an expired inspection sticker and
then allowed him to proceed on his way.23 Less than an hour later,
Abdur-Rashid was pulled over again for the missing front license
plate. 24 The officer also observed that the vehicle "had sticks, twigs
and other debris protruding from the front of it."25  The officer
checked the license of the vehicle and confirmed that Abdur-Rashid
was the registered owner, however, the results incorrectly showed
that the vehicle's insurance was expired.26
Abdur-Rashid presented the officer with the ticket that he re-
ceived from the earlier stop, citing him for the missing license plate
and expired inspection sticker, as proof that the prior officer had al-
York Penal Law § 220.09 (McKinney 2010).
19 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 72.
20 id
21 870 N.Y.S.2d 513, 516 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 2008) (quoting People v. Dunn, 564 N.E.2d
1054, 1058 (N.Y. 1990)). The court expressly declined to address whether the search impli-
cated the Fourth Amendment, stating: "Since there was a founded suspicion here, we need
not address whether a lesser showing-such as applies to the 4th Amendment . .. would satis-
fy the N.Y. Constitution." Id. at 516.
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ready confirmed that his insurance was intact. 27 The officer ordered
Abdur-Rashid out of the vehicle while he attempted to reach the first
officer to corroborate his story.28 After failed attempts to reach the
first officer by radio and phone, the officer noticed that Abdur-Rashid
"started to get a little fidgety and nervous" at the sight of a narcotic-
sniffing dog in the officer's vehicle, which further raised his suspi-
cions.29
The officer then directed his attention to Abdur-Rashid's pas-
senger, Gayle, who "gave the officer a convoluted tale of being in-
volved in a minor accident upon entering the roadway . . . .",3 He
told the officer "an implausible story that [Abdur-Rashid] picked him
up on Long Island, that his job was to keep [Abdur-Rashid] awake en
route to Schenectady, and that [Abdur-Rashid] was going to drive
back from Schenectady to Brooklyn to drop Gayle off mid-afternoon
and then return, alone, to Schenectady later that evening.""3 Between
Gayle's suspicious story and Abdur-Rashid's nervous behavior, the
officer believed further investigation was required.32
The officer ordered Gayle out of the vehicle and retrieved a
narcotic-sniffing dog from his vehicle.33 While circling the exterior
of the vehicle, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs.34 The officer
then allowed the dog inside to sniff the interior of the vehicle and the
dog again alerted the officer to the presence of drugs near the rear
speaker of the passenger side of the vehicle.35 A search of the trunk
revealed a black duffel bag containing two freezer bags of cocaine.36
Abdur-Rashid was charged with criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree.
Following his indictment, Abdur-Rashid moved to suppress
27 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 72.
28 ki
29 Id.
30 Id. at 73.
31 id.




1 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73. For the statutory requirements of criminal possession of a
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the drugs, alleging that they were the result of an illegal search.3 ' Af-
ter a suppression hearing, the trial court admitted the drugs into evi-
dence concluding that they were the fruits of a lawful search. 9 The
appellate division affirmed, "holding that the officer properly con-
ducted an exterior canine sniff of the vehicle based upon 'a founded
suspicion that criminality was afoot.' "40
The New York Court of Appeals granted appeals in both cas-
es and in a five-to-four decision held that under the New York State
Constitution, a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped ve-
hicle "constitutes a search requiring founded suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot and that, in each of these cases, such founded suspi-
cion was established." 4 1 In Devone, the court held that the officers
had a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying
the canine sniff, based on the driver's
inability to produce his driver's license and registra-
tion for the vehicle, coupled with his responses that his
cousin owned the vehicle, that he did not know his
cousin's name, and that [the] defendant was his cou-
sin-together with the fact that the vehicle was regis-
tered to a female and not [the] defendant.42
Similarly, in Abdur-Rashid, the court held that based on the condition
of his vehicle, the passenger's explanation of his unusual travel plans,
and Abdur-Rashid's nervous demeanor over the presence of a narcot-
ic-sniffing dog in the officer's vehicle, taken in the aggregate, estab-
lished a founded suspicion that criminal activity was afoot, justifying
the canine sniff.43
In affirming these convictions, the New York Court of Ap-
peals addressed "whether a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully
stopped vehicle constitutes a search under article I, section 12 of the
New York State Constitution and, if so, what level of suspicion is re-
quired before law enforcement can conduct that search."" The court
3 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73.
3 Id.
4 Id. (quoting People v. Abdur-Rashid, 883 N.Y.S.2d 644, 646-47 (App. Div. 3d Dep't
2009)).
41 Id. at7l1.
42 Id. at 74.
43 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 74.
4 Id. at 7 1.
2011] 557
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rejected the reasonable suspicion standard in the traffic stop context,
explaining that because "there is a 'diminished expectation of privacy
attributed to individuals and their property when traveling in an au-
tomobile,' . . . law enforcement need only meet a lesser standard be-
fore conducting a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped
vehicle." 45 In reaching its decision, the court emphasized that wheth-
er a canine sniff constitutes a search under New York jurisprudence
is contingent upon whether it constitutes an intrusion into an area
where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy. 46 Ulti-
mately, the court held that a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully
stopped vehicle constitutes a search under article I, section 12 of the
New York State Constitution requiring founded suspicion that crimi-
nal activity is afoot.47  Accordingly, both defendants' convictions
were affirmed.48
The federal standard for using a narcotic-sniffing dog to
detect the presence of drugs under the United States Constitution was
established in United States v. Place.49 In Place, the United States
Supreme Court held that the use of drug-sniffing canines does not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
Therefore, federal precedent provides minimal guidance on the level
of suspicion required for police to use this investigative technique in
New York because it is not afforded the same level of protection un-
der the Federal Constitution, as it is under the New York State Con-
stitution.'
In Place, the defendant, Raymond Place, aroused police sus-
picion while standing in line at Miami International Airport to pur-
chase airline tickets to New York.52 The officers stopped Place as he
approached the gate to board his flight and requested that he produce
his airline ticket and identification.5 1 Place complied with the offic-
45 Id at 74 (quoting People v. Yancy, 654 N.E.2d 1233, 1236 (N.Y. 1995)).
46 Id. at 73-74.
47 Idat71.
48 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 71.
49 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
so Id. at 707.
51 Compare Place, 462 U.S. at 707 (holding that a canine sniff does not constitute a search
under the United States Constitution), with Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058 (holding that a canine
sniff constitutes a search under the New York State Constitution).
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ers' request and consented to a search of his luggage, but due to his
impending flight, the officers decided not to conduct the search.54
Prior to his departure, however, the officers inspected the address
tags on Place's luggage and noted that the addresses on his two bags
were different.55 Further investigation later revealed that neither ad-
dress existed. 6 Based on this information and their encounter with
Place, the officers contacted the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA") in New York to alert them about their suspicions of Place.5 '
DEA agents were waiting for Place at LaGuardia Airport in
New York when his flight arrived.58 After Place claimed his lug-
gage, the agents approached him and informed him that based on
their own observations and information they had received from offic-
ers in Miami, they believed that he was carrying narcotics." When
Place refused to consent to a search of his luggage, the agents took
his luggage into custody to obtain a search warrant.6 0 The agents
took Place's luggage to Kennedy Airport where it was subjected to a
''sniff test" by a narcotic-sniffing dog that alerted to the presence of
narcotics in one of the bags.6 ' Because this transpired on a Friday af-
ternoon, the agents retained the luggage until Monday morning to se-
cure a search warrant from a federal magistrate.62 When the officers
finally executed the warrant, they found 1,125 grams of cocaine in
Place's luggage.63
The issue before the Supreme Court was "whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits law enforcement authorities from temporarily
detaining personal luggage for exposure to a trained narcotics detec-
tion dog on the basis of reasonable suspicion that the luggage con-
tains narcotics."6" While the Supreme Court ultimately held that the
prolonged detention of Place's bags constituted a Fourth Amendment




" Place, 462 U.S. at 698.
58 Id.
59 Id. at 698-99.
6o Id. at 699.
61 Id.
62 Place, 462 U.S. at 699.
63 Id.
6 Id. at 697-98.
2011] 559
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tute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.65  The
Court reasoned that a "canine sniff is sui generis,"66 and that because
"this investigative technique is much less intrusive than a typical
search," disclosing only the presence or absence of narcotics, it does
not transcend the Fourth Amendment.67
In Illinois v. Caballes,6 8 the Supreme Court affirmed its hold-
ing in Place, confirming that the use of a narcotic-sniffing dog does
not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. 69 In Caballes,
the Court addressed the constitutionality of this investigative tech-
nique in the context of a traffic stop.70 The Court held that a canine
sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle that does not unne-
cessarily prolong the encounter, does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment because it only reveals the presence or absence of con-
traband, in which there is no legitimate expectation of privacy. 71
In Caballes, the defendant, Roy Caballes, was pulled over for
speeding.72 A member of the Illinois State Police Drug Interdiction
team overheard the dispatch transmission regarding Caballes's sei-
zure and headed over to the scene with a narcotic-sniffing dog.73
While the initial officer wrote Caballes a warning ticket for speeding,
the other officer walked around Caballes's vehicle with the drug-
sniffing dog. The dog alerted to the presence of drugs in the trunk
and a search uncovered marijuana; Caballes was arrested.7' The Illi-
65 Id. at 698. The Court held that the length of the detention of Place's luggage consti-
tuted an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment because "such a seizure can ef-
fectively restrain [a] person since he is subjected to the possible disruption of his travel
plans." Id. at 708-09. The Court reasoned that "when the police seize luggage from the sus-
pect's custody . . . limitations applicable to investigative detentions of the person should de-
fine the permissible scope of an investigative detention. . . ." Place, 462 U.S. at 708-09.
6 Id. at 707 ("We are aware of no other investigative procedure that is so limited both in
the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content of the information re-
vealed by the procedure.").
67 Id. ("This limited disclosure also ensures that the owner of the property is not subjected
to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more intrusive in-
vestigative methods.").
6 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
69 Id. at 409.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 406.
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nois Supreme Court excluded the evidence from trial "concluding
that because the canine sniff was performed without any 'specific and
articulable facts' to suggest drug activity, the use of the dog 'unjusti-
fiably enlarg[ed] the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug inves-
tigation.' "76
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine "[w]hether
the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to
justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legiti-
mate traffic stop."77 The Court confirmed that a canine sniff does not
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
The Court held that "[a] dog sniff conducted during a concededly
lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than the location
of a substance that no individual has any right to possess does not vi-
olate the Fourth Amendment." 79 The Court reasoned that "conduct-
ing a dog sniff [does] not change the character of a traffic stop that is
lawful at its inception and otherwise executed in a reasonable man-
ner, unless the dog sniff itself infringed respondent's constitutionally
protected interest in privacy."80 Because there is no legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in possessing contraband, the use of a narcotic-
sniffing dog to conduct a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully de-
tained vehicle does not constitute a search under the Fourth Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution.8 '
While the United States Supreme Court has explicitly ruled
that a canine sniff does not constitute a search under the Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, the New York Court
of Appeals has held that the use of narcotic-sniffing dogs does consti-
tute a search under the New York Constitution. 82 Because of the dif-
fering treatment in state and federal precedent, the court in De-
vone/Abdur-Rashid turned to New York jurisprudence for guidance
on how to treat a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully stopped ve-
hicle.
76 Id. at 407 (quoting People v. Caballes, 802 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ill. 2003)).
7 Id.
78 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 410.
79 Id. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124 (1984) (holding that the posses-
sion of contraband is not a legitimate privacy interest).
80 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408.
81 Id. at 410.
82 See Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1055 (holding that a canine sniff conducted outside of a de-
fendant's apartment door constitutes a search requiring reasonable suspicion).
5612011]
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In People v. Dunn,83 the New York Court of Appeals refused
to follow Place and held that a dog sniff conducted in the hallway of
an apartment building constitutes a search under article I, section 12
of the New York State Constitution. 84 Rather than focusing its analy-
sis solely on the fact that a dog sniff only discloses "evidence of cri-
minality," the court also based its decision on "whether there has
been an intrusion into an area where an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy.""s Therefore, in New York, the location of
where a canine sniff is conducted is a determinative factor as to
whether the canine sniff constitutes a search and what level of suspi-
cion is required for it to be utilized by law enforcement.86
In Dunn, officers received a tip that the defendant, Jessie
Dunn, was storing drugs in his apartment. Acting pursuant to the
tip, officers brought a drug-sniffing dog to the common hallway out-
side Dunn's apartment door; it immediately alerted to the presence of
drugs. The police secured a search warrant for Dunn's apartment
and upon execution found marijuana, cocaine, handguns, and drug
paraphernalia.8 9 Dunn appealed his conviction alleging that the ini-
tial canine sniff constituted an unlawful search because it was not
supported by probable cause. 90
The New York Court of Appeals granted leave to determine
whether a canine sniff conducted outside of a person's apartment to
determine the presence of drugs constitutes a search. 9' The court
found that a canine sniff does constitute a search within the meaning
" 564 N.E.2d 1054.
SId.
s Id. at 1057-58 ("Unlike the Supreme Court, we believe that the fact that a given inves-
tigative procedure can disclose only evidence of criminality should have little bearing on
whether it constitutes a search.").
86 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73-74 ("Based on our state jurisprudence ... whether a canine
sniff constitutes a search is necessarily dependent upon whether it constitutes an intrusion
into a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy."). Compare Dunn, 564
N.E.2d at 1058 (holding that a canine sniff conducted outside of a defendant's apartment
door constituted a search requiring reasonable suspicion), with People v. Price, 431 N.E.2d
267, 270 (N.Y. 1981) (holding that a canine sniff of a defendant's luggage in an airport did
not constitute a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion or under the New York State Constitution).
87 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1055.
88 Id.
89 id
o Id. at 1056.
' Id at 1055.
[Vol. 27562
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of article I, section 12, but due to "the uniquely discriminate and non-
intrusive nature of such an investigative device, as well as its signifi-
cant utility to law enforcement authorities, [the court] conclude[d]
that it may be used without a warrant or probable cause, provided that
the police have a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illicit
contraband." 92 Because the officers had a reasonable suspicion that
there were drugs in Dunn's apartment, 93 they had sufficient justifica-
tion to conduct the canine sniff.94 Notably, the court was very specif-
ic in its decision about the level of suspicion required for police to
use a narcotic-sniffing dog outside a person's residence. Rather than
requiring reasonable suspicion alone, the court made it clear that "po-
lice have at least a reasonable suspicion that a residence contains illi-
cit contraband before this investigative technique may be em-
ployed." 95
In People v. Price,96 the New York Court of Appeals applied
a similar analytical framework utilized in Dunn, but came to a differ-
ent conclusion. 97 The court in Price held that a canine sniff of a per-
son's luggage does not constitute a search. 98 Therefore, the use of a
trained narcotic-sniffing dog is not necessarily synonymous with a
search under New York jurisprudence. 99 Privacy expectations are a
determinative factor as to whether a canine sniff constitutes a search
in New York.oo
92 Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058.
93 While the court ultimately determined that the police had reasonable suspicion to con-
duct the canine sniff of the common hallway outside of Dunn's apartment based on their
knowledge of his drug activities, "[b]y not having timely raised below the question of
whether the police were lawfully in the common hallway outside his apartment when the
'canine sniff was conducted, defendant ... failed to preserve this issue for ... review." Id.
at 1056 n.2.
94 Id. at 1055. The concurring opinion stressed that "in their view the sniff by a trained
police dog in the hallway outside defendant's apartment did not constitute a search within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or N.Y. Constitution, article
I, [section] 12." Id. at 1059.
9 Id. at 1055 (emphasis added).
96 431 N.E.2d 267.
9 Id. at 270.
98 id
9 Compare Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058 (holding that a canine sniff conducted outside of a
defendant's apartment door constitutes a search requiring reasonable suspicion), with Price,
431 N.E.2d at 270 (holding that a canine sniff of a defendant's luggage in an airport does not
constitute a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution or
under the New York State Constitution).
100 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73-74 ("Based on our state jurisprudence ... whether a canine
5632011]
11
Newman: Court of Appeals of New York: People v. Devone
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2011
TOURO LAWREVIEW
In Price, an officer at the Los Angeles Airport observed de-
fendants, Leon Price and Carl Parson, purchasing plane tickets to
New York in cash, ten minutes prior to departure.o' The officer also
noticed that the men were acting nervous and sweating profusely.102
Based on the defendants' suspicious behavior, the officer contacted
one of his colleagues who escorted a drug-sniffing dog to the bag-
gage area. 0 3  The dog alerted to the presence of drugs in Price's
bag.104 Instead of searching the luggage, however, the officers con-
tacted the DEA which in turn notified the New York State Police De-
partment. 0 5 Based on the officer's observation and the dog's posi-
tive reaction to the luggage, the officers in New York obtained a
search warrant for the defendants' luggage. 106
After the defendants arrived in New York and claimed their
luggage, the DEA officers stopped them and, pursuant to the search
warrant, searched their persons and luggage. 0 7 The search of their
luggage uncovered a large quantity of heroin.' 8 The defendants
were arrested and charged with criminal possession of a controlled
substance in the first degree.' 0 9 The defendants moved to suppress
the drugs arguing "that the use of the dog by the Los Angeles police
constituted a search that was unlawful because it was not authorized
by a warrant."" 0 Accordingly, the defendants alleged that the dog's
reaction could not be used to establish probable cause justifying the
issuance of a search warrant in New York."'
The New York Court of Appeals granted the appeal to address
the issue of "whether the use of a trained dog to indicate the presence
of a controlled substance in a passenger's luggage constitutes a
search within the purview of the Fourth Amendment [or the New
sniff constitutes a search is necessarily dependent upon whether it constitutes an intrusion
into a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy.").










'." Price, 431 N.E.2d at 268.
564 [Vol. 27
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York Constitution]."' 12 The court began its analysis by applying the
two-prong test set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in
Katz, stating: "The right to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures protects people from unreasonable governmental intrusion
wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable expectation of priva-
cy.""' The court concluded that the defendants had no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the air surrounding their luggage or the odor
emanating from it." 4 Whatever legitimate expectation of privacy the
defendants may have had relative to their luggage was reduced when
they turned it over to a third party, the common carrier responsible
for checking luggage for potential safety concerns."s Furthermore,
the court flat out rejected the notion that the dog sniff itself consti-
tuted a search, stating: "Since the dog does nothing more than smell
the air surrounding the luggage in order to detect odors emanating
from that luggage, there was no intrusion or search of the lug-
gage." 1t 6  Accordingly, there was no violation of the defendants'
rights under federal or state law."17
The court in Devone/Abdur-Rashid followed the same analyt-
ical framework it had utilized in Price and Dunn in determining
whether the police's use of a trained narcotic-sniffing dog to conduct
a canine sniff of the exterior of a lawfully detained vehicle consti-
tuted a search under the New York Constitution." 8 Determinative to
the court's decision was "whether [a canine sniff] constitutes an in-
trusion into a place where a person has a reasonable expectation of
privacy."" 9 The court noted that "[o]ne clearly has a greater expec-
tation of privacy in one's home than in an automobile, but that does
not render the latter interest undeserving of constitutional protec-
tion." 20 The court reasoned that "[t]here is a legitimate, albeit re-
112 id.
113 Id. (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968)). See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan,
J., concurring) (establishing the test for determining whether a Fourth Amendment search
has occurred).
114 Id. at 269.
"' Price, 431 N.E.2d. at 270.
116 Id. at 269.
117 Id. at 270.
18 "[T]he analysis should 'focus on whether there has been an intrusion into an area
where an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy.' " Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 73
(quoting Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1058).
119 Id. at 73-74.
120 Id. at 74. See New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1986) (explaining that one
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duced, expectation of privacy in an automobile."'21 However, the
court noted that the expectation of privacy one has in his or her ve-
hicle is certainly greater than the relatively low expectation of priva-
cy that one has in his or her luggage in the hands of a common carri-
er.122  Therefore, the court concluded that the use of a narcotic-
sniffing dog to conduct a canine sniff on the exterior of a lawfully de-
tained vehicle constitutes a search under article I, section 12 of the
New York Constitution.123 However, the court did not adopt the rea-
sonable suspicion standard it had utilized in Dunn.'24
Striking a balance between Price and Dunn, the court in De-
vone/Abdur-Rashid declared that while a canine sniff of the exterior
of an automobile constitutes a search under article I, section 12 of the
New York Constitution, due to the lesser expectation of privacy one
has in his or her vehicle, law enforcement need only a founded suspi-
cion that criminality is afoot, as opposed to the more demanding rea-
sonable suspicion standard to utilize this investigative technique. 125
The court explained that "[g]iven [the] diminished expectation of pri-
vacy [one has in their car], coupled with the fact that canine sniffs are
far less intrusive than the search of a residence and provide 'signifi-
cant utility to law enforcement authorities' application of the founded
suspicion standard in these cases is appropriate." l26
Therefore, law enforcement officers in New York may utilize
a canine sniff of the exterior of any lawfully detained vehicle so long
as they have "a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot." 27
While this is a rather controversial decision, it is a logical conclusion
based on the New York Court of Appeals' precedent and method of
analysis in this area. The court has consistently opined that "whether
a canine sniff constitutes a search is necessarily dependent upon
has a lessened expectation of privacy in an automobile due to its function, its lack of ability
to escape public scrutiny when traveling on public roads, and the fact that they are subject to
pervasive regulations by the state). But see Arizona v. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1720 (2009)
("Although we have recognized that a motorist's privacy interest in his vehicle is less sub-
stantial than in his home, the former interest is nevertheless important and deserving of con-
stitutional protection.").
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whether it constitutes an intrusion into a place where a person has a
reasonable expectation of privacy." 28 Because there is a diminished
expectation of privacy in one's car, it logically flows that there
should be a lesser showing of suspicion to utilize this investigative
technique on the exterior of an automobile than outside one's
home. 129
However, the court did not take steps to narrowly tailor or re-
define the founded suspicion standard in this context. Prior to this
decision, New York courts have utilized the "founded suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot" standard only in regards to law enforce-
ment's "common-law right to inquir[y]."1 30 Under the common-law
right of inquiry "a policeman is entitled to interfere with a citizen to
the extent necessary to gain explanatory information, but short of a
forcible seizure."' 3 ' Therefore, the court's use of the "founded suspi-
cion" standard to justify a canine sniff of the exterior of an automo-
bile is more of a push towards the federal standard, that the use of
narcotic-sniffing dogs does not constitute a search, rather than recog-
nition of the diminished expectation of privacy one has in his or her
automobile. By only requiring law enforcement to have the same
level of suspicion needed to make an inquiry to conduct a canine sniff
of the exterior of a vehicle, it seems counterintuitive to justify the lat-
ter as a search. Furthermore, the court's failure to redefine the
founded suspicion standard, or at least limit it to suspicions of drug
activities, does not discredit such an interpretation.
The decision in Devone/Abdur-Rashid is troubling because of
the broad implications of the "founded suspicion that criminal activi-
ty is afoot" standard set forth by the court. As emphasized by the
dissent, prior to this decision, having "a founded suspicion that crim-
inal activity is afoot" would only permit an officer to request to
128 Id. at 73-74.
129 See Yancy, 654 N.E.2d 1233. In Yancy, New York adopted the federal automobile ex-
ception to the warrant requirement, stating:
Warrantless searches of automobiles are already recognized as an excep-
tion to the general rule that a warrantless search is per se unreasonable,
given the mobility of the vehicle and the corresponding probability that
any contraband contained therein will quickly disappear, and the dimi-
nished expectation of privacy attributed to individuals and their property
when travelling in an automobile.
Id. at 1236 (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)).
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search, not serve as justification for a search itself.3 2 Furthermore,
the "founded suspicion" standard put forth by the majority in De-
vone/Abdur-Rashid is problematic because it gives police unfettered
discretion to conduct canine sniffs of lawfully detained vehicles even
when the behavior that raises the officer's suspicion is not directly re-
lated to the purpose of utilizing a trained narcotic-sniffing dog.'33
"By way of example, the canine in Devone could not assist the offic-
ers in ascertaining whether defendant's vehicle was stolen, as origi-
nally suspected." 34 However, the court upheld the constitutionality
of the search based on the officers' founded suspicion that "criminal
activity was afoot" with no mention of whether the officers had sus-
picions that the defendant was in possession of narcotics.
Perhaps a more appropriate standard would be a founded sus-
picion that narcotics are in the vehicle or a founded suspicion that
narcotic-related criminality is afoot.13' This would have been a more
prudent choice considering the purpose of utilizing a narcotic-sniffing
dog is to detect the presence of narcotics. Under the court's ruling in
Devone/Abdur-Rashid, however, officers in New York are free to
utilize a drug-sniffing dog under New York law if police have a
founded suspicion that any type of criminal activity is afoot, not just
the possession of narcotics. "Without a nexus between the suspicion
held by the police and the capability of the canine, the probe sanc-
tioned by the [Devone/Abdur-Rashid court] is but a fishing expedi-
tion."l3
Michael S. Newman
132 Id. at 75 (Ciparick, J., dissenting). See People v. Dunbar, 840 N.E.2d 106 (N.Y. 2005)
(explaining that police must have founded suspicion in order to request to search a defen-
dant's person or car.); People v. Hollman, 590 N.E.2d 204 (N.Y. 1992) (explaining the dis-
tinction between a mere request for information and the common-law right to inquiry, which
must be supported by founded suspicion).
'3 See Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 76 (Ciparick, J., dissenting) ("Trained canines are capable
only of detecting drugs.").
134 Id.
135 See Dunn, 564 N.E.2d at 1055 (requiring "reasonable suspicion that a residence con-
tains illicit contraband' for officers to conduct a canine sniff in the common hallway of an
apartment building) (emphasis added).
"3 Devone, 931 N.E.2d at 76 (Ciparick, J., dissenting).
* J.D. Candidate 2012, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg School of Law; B.A. 2006 in
Criminal Justice and Psychology, University at Albany, State University of New York.
568 [Vol. 27
16
Touro Law Review, Vol. 27 [2011], No. 3, Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol27/iss3/4
